We examine performance and management characteristics of Fortune 500 firms experiencing one of three types of control change: internally pricipitated management turnover, hostile takeover, and friendly takeover. We find that firms experiencing internally precipitated management turnover perform poorly relative to other firms in their industries, but are not concentrated in poorly performing industries. In contrast, targets of hostile takeovers are concentrated in troubled industries. There is also weaker evidence that hostile takeover targets underperform their industry peers. We interpret this evidence as consistent with the idea that the board of directors is capable of firing managers whose leadership leads to poor performance relative to industry, but that an external challenge in the form of a hostile takeover is often required when th. whole industry is in decline.
Introduction.
Ineffective boards of directors have been held responsible for many woes of American companies (Mace, 1971 , Jensen, 1986 , including the advent of hostile takeovers. The board is blamed for both failing to recognize the problems of the firm, and for failing to stand up to top officers when tough solutions to these problems are needed. Where the board fails, external control devices come to play a role.
An alternative view suggests that the board serves its monitoring and control functions effectively (Fama and Jensen, 1983) . Consistent with this view, Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) , Warner, Watts and Wruck (1988) and Weisbach (1988) find that poor performance of the firm increases the likelihood of chief Executive Officer (CEO) replacement, and attribute this to monitoring by the board. Evidently, board, can deal with at least some of the problems of the firm.
The question then is: which problems of the firm can the board of directors deal with effectively and which ones instead trigger the external control market? Arguably, the board's effectiveness depends in part on whether the problem experienced by the firm is idiosyncratic or industrywide. In the former case, it might be relatively easy for the board to assess blame and fire a CEO whose leadership causes the company to underperfora its otherwise healthy industry. In the case of industry-wide problems, such as those caused by foreign competition, technological progress, or deregulation, the board's problem is much harder. It is then less clear that the fin is making mistakes • or what those mistakes are, when the whole industry is suffering. With this kind of uncertainty, most boards would be reluctant to blame the CEO for the firm's problems, let alone fire him. Even when the board understands that changes are needed, it might refuse to force the current CEO (or his replacement) to divest divisions, close plants lay off workers, cut wages, and take other painful measures that might increase profits in a declining industry. Under these circumstances, an external challenge to the board's authority may be necessary to enforce shareholder wealth maximization.
The board's effectiveness also depends on the status and power of the CEO. Some managers, by virtue of their ability, ownership stake, tenure, or status as founders might be able to dominate the board, rather than be controlled by it whatever problems the company faces. If the board's comparative advantage is to deal with certain types of problems end with handling particular CEOs companies going through internallycaused management turnover will be different than targets of hostile takeovers. By contrasting the characteristics of the two types of firms, this paper tries to find out what boards do in fact accomplish.
Our analysis focuses on three alternative means of control change in a sample of 454 publicly-traded Fortune 500 companies that we follow between 1981 and 1985. The control methods that we study include internally-caused complete turnover of the top officers of the corporation, friendly sale of the company, and the hostile takeover1. Complete turnover of top managers appears to be the best measure of forced internally precipitated change, as opposed to orderly transitions. We do not treat ordinary internal succession as a control change, since those do not usually represent responses to management problems (Vancfl, 1987) . In fact, we present evidence in section 4 that, far from being used as a disciplinary device, internal succession is associated with abnormally good performance. Friendly acquisitions are 'Other recent studies of the characteristics of takeover targets include Masbrouck (1985) , Palepu (1986) , Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) , and Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) . studied because they too represent control changes, but not necessarily of the same disciplinary nature as hostile takeovers (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988 , present evidence on this point). As such, friendly acquisitions provide a useful contrast to both hostile takeovers and internally-caused complete turnover.
We find that complete top management turnover is associated primarily with poor performance of a fin relative to its industry and not with adverse industry shocks. In contrast, hostile takeovers are targeted at firms concentrated in troubled industries. While targets of hostile takeovers also underperform their already troubled industries, this effect is less pronounced than poor performance of their industries. This evidence is consistent with the following conclusions: In many cases, boards of directors succeed in comparing the performance of their companies to the industry standard, and in dismissing management teams that underperform the industry.
In contrast, boards typically fail to deal with problems faced by an entire industry in trouble. These boards are either unsure that management is doing a bad job in responding to the adverse industry shock, or they refuse to force changes that an improvement of profits requires, such as divisional selloffs or wage reductions. In this respect firms acquired in friendly deals are more similar to firms experiencing complete turnover than they are to targets of hostile takeovers. To the extent that they are disciplinary at all, friendly deals seem to be encouraged by corporate boards that are faced with poor performance relative to a healthy industry.
We also find that fins run by members of the founding family and CEOs with large direct ownership are less likely to experience either complete management turnover or a hostile takeover. Both disciplinary devices are less effective against CEOs with strong attachment to the firm, who either S control the board or can better weather a hostile threat. In an additional attempt to measure poor internal discipline, we focus on firms where the top management team consists of a single individual. We define such firms as cases where only one executive holds any of the three titles of chairman, chief executive officer and president and where he is also alone in s&gning the letter to shareholders in the annual report. We find that, as long as such one-man firms are run by a young top executive, they are less likely than an average firm to experience complete turnover of the management team, but. more likely than an average firm to be a target of a hostile takeover.
Hostile takeovers may thus be a way to deal with these young Thosses" whom the board cannot effectively control.
In suary, our evidence indicates that, given the current capabilities of boards of directors, internal turnover and hostile takeovers provide complementary means of enforcing maximization of shareholder value.2 Hostile takeovers become relevant precisely when the problems of the firm and the status of top management make the board's disciplinary role too difficult to perform effectively. Section 2 of the paper discusses the data we use in our empirical work, and presents the basic characteristics of firms that undergo different forms of control changes. Section 3 presents the main empirical results that attempt to identify characteristics conducive to particular means of control change. Section 4 compares firms experiencing complete turnover of the management tea -. used as a proxy for disciplinary turnover --with firms experiencing a partial turnover of top management. Section 5 concludes.
2which does not necessarily coincide with social welfare; see Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and Shleifer and Sunars (1988 Among the firms that have not been acquired, we define complete turnover as a complete change between 1980 and 1985 in the list of officers signing the letter to shareholders in the annual report. A firm experiences a complete turnover if none of the officers who signed the annual report in 1980 also signs in 1985. An alternative way to define complete turnover would be using changes in the list of people holding top titles rather than in the list of signers. The trouble with following this path is that titles can be retained by figureheads, who have no effective control or power.
Signing the annual report, in contrast, seems to be a more effective proxy for leadership. We focus on complete rather than partial turnover of signatures because we are interested in disciplinary management changes forced by the board. Presumably, most changes in which one co-signer of the annual report replaces another represent ordinary succession rather than disciplinary actionby the board. The results in section 4 strongly support this conclusion.
Where a company has experienced a management turnover prior to a hostile takeover, this company is treated as an acquisition and not as a turnover.
This happens in 4 out of 40 hostile takeovers. While in these cases the board is arguably trying to deal with the management problems, it is not providing an adequate solution. A takeover ii still required to provide an alternative that mimizes shareholder wealth. Similarly, if management turns over prior to a friendly acquisition, which also happens in 4 out of 34 cases, the turnover cannot be properly viewed as solving the need for new management. Accordingly, we classify these cases as friendly acquisitions.
The above definition yields 93 cases of complete turnover. This number seems too high as a measure of disciplinary turnover, and doubtless still includes cases of ordinary succession. Some such non-disciplinary cases might be planned CEO retirements accompanied by the appointment of an outside replacement team, but such cases are rare (Vancil, 1987) . More commonly, these would be cases where the planned internal successor did not come from the list of 1980 signers of the annual report. Overall, although our definition probably covers most extraordinary non-takeover-related management changes, it also covers some cases of ordinary replacement that only add noise.
In section 4, we separately look at the cases of partial turnover, in which the Forbes-listed top executive (usually the CEO) changes between 1980 and 1985 but there is no complete turnover in the list of signers of the letter to shareholders. (The Forbes-listed top executive is alway. among the signers of the letter to shareholders in the annual report.) Our sample includes 70 cases of such partial turnover. Arguably, incumbent top executives are partly competing for their Jobs with other executives in the company. On that theory, even replacement by a member of the same management team can be disciplinary. Our view, supported by the results of section 4, is that most of the partial turnovers in our sample represent ordinary succession and not disciplinary changes. Accordingly, we focus on complete turnover to gauge the effectiveness of the board as a control device. Since we are looking at an imperfectly measured Q, the interpretation of Q as a measure of the valuation of intangible assets can be problematic. The replacement cost of assets could be overstated, for example, if the firm The market value of comeon stock is taken from Standard and Poor's COMFUSTAT tape. The market value of preferred stock is estimated by dividing the preferred stock dividend figure (reported on COMPUSTAT) by the Moody's preferred dividend rate for the median-risk companies. The market value of the fin's debt is taken as the value of its short ten liabilities net of its short-term assets (from COMPUSTAT) plus an estimate of the market value of its long-term debt. Estimates of long-ten debt for our firms were obtained from the NBfl's R&D Master File (see Cu-ins, Hall. and Laderman, 1982) . These estimates are constructed on the assumption that all long-term debt has an orignial maturity of 20 years • and using a matrix of bond prices in year t for bonds due in year s from the Moody's corporate BAA bond price series. The age structure of corprate debt is estimated from changes in the firm's book value of long-term debt in each of the 20 previous years on the COMPUSTAT tape. Using this age structure estimate end the bond price matrix, Cunins et al. (1982) calculate the value of each fin's long-term debt. bought its assets tong ago and their value depreciated significantly because of technological progress, foreign competition, or other changes. In these cases, the inflation-adjusted historical cost is a poor guide to the true replacement cost, but a very low Q is probably stilt a reliable indicator of a declining firm.
Our second measure of performance is the cumulative abnormal return over the period 1978-1980, calculated using the Capital Asset Pricing Model. The data for returns are the standard monthly series from the Center for Research in Securities Prices. The reason for using abnormal returns is that they capture the market's evaluation of more recent news about the fin's current and future profitability. Our sample using returns consists of 427 non-OTC firms, of which B7 went through complete turnover of management, 37 were targets of hostile takeovers, and 32 of friendly ones.
Our third measure of performance is employment growth over the 1978-1980 period. Although employment growth is not an unambiguous measure of performance, we use it for two reasons. First, it is more closely related to the business side, as opposed to being based on stock market prices. Use of such a measure enables us to say that takeover targets are not characterized solely by being priced by the market below the tru. value of their earnings streams under their current operating strategies. Second, employment growth seems like a fairly reliable measure of industry health even though it may be an ambiguous measure of f in performance within an industry. Our sample using employment growth consists of 449 firms, of which 93 went through complete turnover of management, 39 were targets of hostile takeovers, and 34 of friendly ones.
Although we consider takeovers and management changes during the period 1981 to 1985, all our performance measures are calculated based on the data from a prior period. This ii done for two reasons. First1 it is difficult to find an appropriat. way to compare performance of firms that experienced control changes between 1981 and 1985 with those that experienced none, except by looking at all of them prior to the hazard period. While for the sample of firma experiencing change it might be more natural to look at performance closer to the time of that change, there is no natural time frame in which to measure performance of firms where the management stayed intact.
More importantly, in choosing a prior period, our aim was to avoid mixing in the effects of the market's anticipation of future restructuring activity.
Starting in the early 1980s. a large component of market valuation of many industrial fins may have been traceable to the expected premium from a takeover or a restructuring. Prior to that period, corporate restructurings were less prominent, and hence it is likely that the market valued fins primarily as going concerns under the current management. Since two of our three performance measures are based on stock market prices, our results depend on these prices reflecting expected future profitability under current management, and not the expected premium from a control change.
For all three performance measures, we look separately at industry-wide and firm-specific performance. For each fins in the sample, we consider both the average Q of iti industry at the 3-digit SIC code level and the deviation of its Q fro, the average Q of its industry. Analagously, we look at both industry abnormal returns, and at the deviation of the firm s abnormal, return from the industry average, as well as at industry-wide and firm-specific employment growth rates. This differentiation between industry effects and firm-specific effects is the main contribution of this study. We are interested in finding out whether boards respond differentially to industry-wide and firm-specific problems, and whether takeovers are differentially targeted at firms with these distinct types of problems. Table 1 presents the means of performance measures of our sample companies for four categories of firms. The first three Categories include firms that experienced one of the three types of management change: complete turnover, hostile takeover, or friendly acquisition; the fourth category includes the remaining ('residual") firms. The results suggest that firms experiencing complete turnover or a hostile takeover have an average Q statistically significantly lower than that of residual firms. robin's Q of complete turnover firms is .734, which is 27% below Tobins Q of residual firms equal to .932 (t--2.20). Tobin's Q of hostile takeover targets is .524, which is 44% below .932 (t--3.OO).
In contrast, Tobin's Q of firms acquired in a friendly deal is .774, which while lower than that of residual firms, is not statistically significantly so.
The decomposition of Q into an industry-specific component, IQ, and a firm-specific component, DQ, reveals important differences between hostile takeovers and complete turnover as control devices4. While among firms experiencing complete turnover IQ is not appreciably lower than it is for residual firms, among hostile takeover targets IQ is on average 19% below that for residual firms (t--2.02). To the extent that IQ measures industry performance, this evidence indicates that hostile takeovers are targeted at firms in troubled industries, but that complete management turnover is not associated with industry troubles.
4Note that in Table 1 the means of the industry and within industry components of the performance variables do not sum identically to the means of the performance variables themselves. This happens because the means are calculated using slightly different subsamples due to missing data.
The evidence on fin-specific performance, as measured by DQ, shows that both targets of hostile acquisitions and firms experiencing complete turnover underperform their industries. Complete turnover fins have an average DQ of -.14, which is significantly below DQ for no outcome firms (t--2.56).
Hostile targets also have an average DQ of -.14, with the test for equality vis a vis no outcome firms having a t-statistic of .1.79.
Although fins sold to friendly acquirors show both DQ and EQ below that of residual, firms, these differences in performance are not statistically significant. Moreover, they are not nearly as large in magnitud. as the corresponding performance shortfalls of hostile takeover and complete turnover firms. We cannot then conclude that targets of friendly acquisitions are concentrated in troubled industries, or that they significantly underperform their industries. Friendly acquisitions are not significantly related to performance as measured by Q. IQ or DQ.
The results using abnormal stock returns during the period 1978-1980 are also presented in Table 1 . Evidence on cumulative 1978-1980 abnormal returns largely but not always corroborates that on Tobin's Q. Over this period, firms experiencing complete turnover or hostile takeover have abnormal returns of -7.3% and -11.3% respectively, compared to +5.2% for firms experiencing no control outcome. Targets of friendly bids have 1978-1980 abnormal returns of -5.6%, but this is not reliably different than the abnormal returns for no outcome firms. Also, consistent with the results on Q, the industry abnormal return is -8.5% for targets of hostile takeovers, and +1.4% for complete turnover firms.
The results on Tobins Q and on abnormal returns are also in some ways different. First, the fin-specific component of abnormal returns for hostile takeover targets is not reliably different from the fin-specific abnormal return for no outcome firms. The univariate returns data thus suggest that hostile takeovers are primarily associated with industry-wide troubles and less with fin-specific trouble., while the converse is true about complete turnover. Some multivariate tests of whether firm-specific problems matter for hostile takeovers are presented in Section 3.
The second interesting differencà between the results using Tobin's Q and abnormal returns is the evidence on friendly acquisitions. During the 1978-1980 period, the industry-wide abnormal return on these firms is +9.4%, but the firm-specific abnormal return is -14.9%. which is different from that for no outcome firms at the 5% level. This suggests that targets of friendly acquisitions, like firms undergoing complete turnover of top management, are experiencing some firm-specific problems prior to control change.
Evidence on employment growth for 1978-1980 closely mirrors that for 1978-1980 stock market returns. Firms experiencing complete turnover have substantially lower employment growth rates than their industry peers, whereas those industry peers grow at rates comparable to the rest of the Fortune 500. Targets of hostile takeovers are in low employment growth industries, and there is weak evidence that these firms also lag their industry peers. Finally, targets of friendly bide are in industries with high employment growth, but significantly lag behind their industry peers.
Despite the close parallels between the results for stock market returns and employment growth, these employment numbers should be interpreted with caution. A high level of employment growth relative to industry neers is not necessarily a signal of superior performance, since excessive employment growth can itself be an important deviation from value-maximization. At the same time, industry-wide employment growth is probably a reliable indicator of industry health. Accordingly, our finding that targets of hostile takeovers belong to industries with low employment growth supports our interpretation of the results for Tobin's Q and abnormal returns as related to poor performance and not just to stock market undervaluation.
The inconsistency of our results for friendly acquisitions using alternative performance variables should probably be attributed to the different aspects of performance that Tobin's Q and the other two variables measure. Targets of friendly mergers are often thought to have considerable intangible assets, such as a growing customer base, to which the acquiror can add management skills or access to capital. As a result of having such intangible assets, these firms are unlikely to have a low measured Tobin's Q, even if they are performing poorly. Our evidence would then suggest that the likely candidate. for a friendly acquisition are firms with considerable intangible assets that have recently underperformed their industry.
Although no clear picture emerges for performance characteristics of friendly acquisitions, the results support a consistent picture of performanc. of firms subject to disciplinary" control changes. Whether performance is measured using Tobin's Q, stock market returns, or employment growth, poor industry performance is prevalent among targets of hostile takeovers, in contrast, firms experiencing complete management turnover are best characterized by their poor performance relative to their own industries and not by poor industry performance. The evidence is less clear as to whether poor performance within industry is also important in predicting hostile takeovers. Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer that exist in the company and he is also the sole signer of the letter to shareholders in the annual report. Of the 113 executives who satisfy the first criterion all but 12 satisfy the second; the rest cosign the annual report with a Vice Chairman or a Vice President and hence are arguably not completely alone at the helm.
The BOSS variable thus tries to identify top executives who either completely Walkling and Long (1984) find that managers with a larger stake are less likely to resist a tender offer. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) find that management ownership reduces the likelihood of hostile bids, and raises that of friendly ones. dominate the management of their company, or else have no internal replacement in mind.
Since BOSSes are alone at the helm, their retirement or removal is, by construction, a complete turnover. Because we are interested in the effect of entrenchment on the form of control device used, we want to minimize the impact of planned retirements on our results. To this end, we focus on young BOSSes. The dummy variable '(BOSS is set equal to 1 for companies run by a BOSS no more than 60 years of age in 1980. Except for members of founding families, YBOSSes are probably the most difficult to discipline through internal control devices. Of the 101 BOSSes in the sample, 79 are young BOSSes ('(BOSSes), and the other 22 are over 60. By comparison, Ill firms count among their top management a member of the founding family. Table 2 presents the characteristics of top management by type of control change. Not surprisingly, a firm experiencing complete turnover is about 40% as likely to be run by a founder or a member of the founding family as a residual firm. Similarly, targets of hostile takeovers are only S5% as likely to be run by a member of the founding family as residual firms. In contrast, firms run by founding families are more likely to be targets of friendly acquisitions than residual fins, although this result is only marginally significAnt. This finding replicates the result in Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) that founders are harder to force out in a hostile takeover but are more likely to sell their firms when they choose to retire or diversify. The earlier paper did not consider management turnover.
The equity attic, of the Forbes-listed top executive works largely the same way as the founding family variable. It reduces the likelihood of complete turnover and of a hostile takeover, but raises that of a friendly acquisition. Our preferred interpretation of this result is similar to that for the founding family variable.
The higher average age of the CEO in firms experiencing complete turnover probably reflects greater incidence of retirements. More interesting is the result that the average top executive of a target of a hostile bid is younger than that of a no outcome firm. This result suggests that hostile takeovers might be a way to get rid of CEOs with an otherwise long expected employment with the firm. Top executives of targets of friendly acquisitions, by contrast, are as old as those of residual fins.
The main results in Table 2 concern the BOSS variable defined above. A f ira experiencing complete turnover is less likely to be run by a BOSS than a residual firm, despite the fact that g turnover of a BOSS is automatically a complete turnover. A firm experiencing complete turnover is only 30% as likely to be run by a BOSS aged 60 or under as a residual firm, suggesting that young BOSSes are relatively immune to internal discipline. Of course, this may largely reflect a pure age effect. In section 3, we estimate the impact of a young BOSS controlling for age.
BOSSes have a radically different experience with hostile takeovers than they do with complete turnover. Targets of hostile takeovers are more likely to be nan by both young and old bosses than the no outcome fins, with the differences significant at the 10% level. Thus the probability that a hostile target is run by a young BOSS is .3, which is 62% higher than .185, the probability that a no outcome fin is nan by a young BOSS. This suggests that to get rid of a young BOSS one may have to buy the company. Firms acquired in friendly deals are also more likely to be run by young BOSSes, but this result is not statistically significant.
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This preliminary evidence suggests that characteristics of management might be extremely important in determining the form of control change. Some managers, such as founders, owners of large stakes, or BOSSes seem to be relatively immune to internal discipline. But not all of these groups are equally difficult to remove in a takeover. Young BOSSes in particular may be a class of mangers against whom hostile takeovers are much more effective than action by the board. It is also interesting that friendly takeovers are more likely to occur in firms with young BOSSes. These may represent situations in which board members welcome an acquisition because they cannot work out a solution to their management problem themselves. But these cases may differ from the hostile takeovers where the board is presumably unwilling to condone the disciplinary changes sought by the raider.
Although the evidence presented in this section sheds light on the functioning of various control devices, it is not conclusive. The problem is that many of the performance and management variables are correlated with each other. In the next section, we turn to a multivariate analysis to determine which characteristics of the firm determine the form of control change.
Nultivariate Analysis.
This section presents 4-choice logit estimates of the determinants of the form of control change. The four choices are: complete turnover of the top management (not followed by an acquisition), hostile takeover, friendly acquisition and none of the above. To avoid inducing spurious correlations because large firms are less likely to be acquired, we control for firm size in the logits. The measure of size we use is the logarithm of the market value of the firm's assets, calculated identically to the numerator of Q.
Hence, all the multinomial. logits are estimated on the subsample of 371 firms for which we could compute Q, even when abnormal return or employment growth is used as the measure of performance. Tables 3 and 4 present the results using Q as the measure of performance. The omitted category are firms that neither were acquired nor experienced a complete turnover (residual firms).
The results using Q a. a measure of performance indicate that, relative to the probability of being a residual firm, the probability of óomplete turnover is lower when the firm is run by a member of the founding family, when the top executive is aged 60 or under, when the firm outperforms its industry, and when it is run by a BOSS aged 60 or under, although the last effect is not significant at conventional levels. Since we are controlling for age, we are capturing the marginal effect of young BOSS only. In the logit, the log odds of a complete turnover versus no outcome is not significantly affected by industry Q, or by the equity stake of the top executive. In terms of probabilities rather than log odds ratios, starting from the 'base case in which the performance variables are set equal to their median values and all of the other independent variable, are set equal to their mean values, when Q relative to industry falls to the top of its lowest quartile, the estimated probability of a complete turnover rises from 17.7% to 20.0%. The estimated probability drops from l7.7i to 8.8% when the firm is run by a member of the founding family. These estimated probabilities are contained in Table 4 .
The log odds of a friendly acquisition relative to no outcome (residual firms) does not seem to be significantly affected by almost any of our variables, although this result is at least partly due to the small number (17) of friendly acquisitions in the sample for which we have complete data.
Notably, young age, membership in the founding family and ownership stake 21 have no statistically significant influence on the log odds of a friendly acquisition. We do, however, find the probability of a friendly acquisition to be higher for firms run by BOSSes aged 60 or under.
Consistent with our earlier evidence, the log odds of a hostile takeover versus no outcome increases with poor performance of the industry and with poor performance within industry. This log odds ratio is also higher for firms not run by a member of the founding family and, albeit with a t-statistic of only 1.14, firms that are run by a young BOSS. Young age by itself has no real effect on the probability of a hostile (or for that matter friendly) acquisition. Finally, the results indicate that large size reduces vulnerability to a hostile takeover, as one would expect.
These estimates are interpreted in terms of probabilities in Table 4 . Starting at the base case (performance variables at their median values and all others at their mean values), the probability of a hostile acquisition increases from 5.7% to 8.4% when industry Q drops to the top of its lowest quartile. Similarly, the probability of a hostile takeover rises from 5.7% to 7.4% when DQ falls to the top of its lowest quartile.
Two more results from this regression are worth emphasizing. First, poor performance within industry is typical of both targets of hostile takeovers and of I iris experiencing complete turnover, but poor industry performance is typical only of the former. The effect of IQ on the log odds of hostile acquisition versus complete turnover is statistically significant at the 5% level (t-l.97), whereas the corresponding effect of DQ on the log odds ratio is not (t-,779) . This is consistent with the view that boards are more successful in addressing firm-specific than industry-wide problems.
Second, the presence of a BOSS aged 60 or under actually has opposite effects on the log odds of complete turnover versus no outcome and of hostile takeover versus no outcome. The log odds of a complete turnover versus a hostile takeover decline. significantly (t-2.03) in the presence of a young boss. In terms of probabilities, the presence of a young boss is associated with a rise in the probability of a hostile takeover from 3.7% to 8.8% and a fall in the probability of complete turnover from 17.7% to 8.7% starting at the base case (i.e., the mean value of the young BOSS variable).
One interpretation of these results is that young BOSSes can effectively stand up to the board of directors, but succumb to hostile bidders. In contrast, members of founding families seem to neither turn ovei nor lose out to hostile bidders, indicating that they are more effectively entrenched than the young BOSSes. The ownership stake of the top executive also has a negative effect on the log odds of both control changes relative to no outcome, although the estimates are not statistically significant.
Tables 5 and 6 present the results of the logit using abnormal returns for the 1978-1980 period instead of Tobin's Q.
The results for complete turnover are very similar to those for 'robin's Q: the presence of a founder, young age of the top executive, good performance relative to industry, and the presence of a young Boss all reduce the log odds of complete turnover versus no outcome, although the coefficient on the young BOSS variable is not significant. The estimated probability of a complete turnover rises from 17.9% to 21.1% as 1978-1980 abnormal returns relative to industry decline to the top of the lowest quartile starting from the base case. As in the previous logit, the presence of a young BOSS raises the log odds of a friendly acquisition. Starting at the base case for all other independent variables, the estimated probability of a friendly acquisition rises from 4.5% to 10.5% going from a firm without a young BOSS to one with a young BOSS.
The most important difference in the results for Tobin's Q and abnormal returns is that, when abnormal returns are used, poor performaüce relative to industry no longer significantly raises the log odds of a hostile takeover.
Using either measure, we have the result that, relative to residual firms, poor industry performance raises the odds of hostile takeovers, whereas poor performance within industry raises the odds of complete turnover. The log odds of a hostile takeover vis a vis complete turnover increases significantly with poor industry performance measured either by Q (t-l.97) or abnormal returns (t-l.84). The effect of poor firm-specific performance on the log odds of a hostile takeover versus complete turnover shows no clear tendency at all.
The results using abnormal returns also confirm the finding using tobin's Q that large firm size and the presence of the founding family reduce the log odds of a hostile acquisition versus no outcome. The presence of a young Boss raises the log odds of a hostile takeover (t-1.59). In fact, the effect of young Boss on the log odds of complete turnover versus hostile takeovers is highly significant (t-2.2l). In terms of probabilities rather than log odds ratios, having a young boss at the helm is associated with an estimated increase in the probability of hostile takeover from 6.0% to 11.0% and an estimated reduction in the probability of complete turnover from 17.9% to 9.2% starting at the base case. These multivariate results bear out our earlier finding that young BOSSes are less vulnerable to a threat by the board and more vulnerable to one by a takeover artist.
Tables 7 and 8 present the results of a aultinomial logit using 1978-1980 employment growth as a performance, measure. Again, the results fairly closely track those for the other performance measures. The most notable exception is that the idiosyncratic component of employment growth comes in much less strongly in predicting both complete turnover and hostile takeovers than the idiosyncratic components of either abnormal returns or Tobin's Q. This is consistent with the ambiguity of the firm-specific component of employment growth as a measure of relative performance. On the other hand, low industry employment growth predicts hostile takeovers, consistent with the accuracy of industry employment growth as an indicator of industry health. The employment numbers thus support our conclusion that hostile takeovers are targeted at firms in troubled industries.
complete and Partial Turnover.
One issue raised in the introduction is whether complete turnover of the management team (defined using the list of signers of the letter to shareholders in the annual report) is an adequate proxy for disciplinary turnover. We have already recognized that this variable includes some cases that are not disciplinary, such as ordinary retirements or deaths of sole signer.. The question addressed in this section is whether the complete turnover variable omits some disciplinary replacements. In particular, we look at the characteristics of firms experiencing a partial turnover of top officers to see if they look like firms in need of disciplinary intervention.
On our definition, a firm experiences partial turnover if a) its Forbesdesignated top officer changes between 1980 and 1985. and b) the turnover of the list of signers is not complete. This definition suggests three ways in which partial turnover can occur. First, one of the 1980 signers could become the Forbes-listed top executive by 1985. Second, an insider who was not a signer could get rapidly promoted to top executive, while some of the 1980 signers remain among the top management signing the letter in 1985.
Third. a top executive could be brought in from the outside, but some Even internal succession can be disciplinary in nature, however. This would be the case if the board asks the CEO to resign, but still invites one of the current top managers to replace him. To evaluate this possibility, Table 9 presents mean performance characteristics of three types of firms.
These include firms experiencing complete turnover (already described in Table 1 ), firms experiencing partial zrnover, and firms in which the 1980 top executive is still at the helm in 1985.
The results on performance measures suggest that firms experiencing partial turnover do better than firms experiencing complete turnover. In particular, they have a statistically significantly higher average Q that appears to be primarily a within industry effect. Partial turnover firms have the average DQ of .131, compared to -.138 for complete turnover firms.
The t-statistic for the difference between the two is 2.23. interestingly, partial turnover firms seem to be outperforming even the no turnover firms in their industry (with DQ of .131 compared to .042), although this difference is not statistically significant. It is hard to reconcile the result that firms with partial turnover outperform their industry with the notion that partial turnover is typically a disciplinary action.
Similar results obtain using abnormal returns as a measure of performance. Most importantly, the firm-specific component of abnormal returns is quite different for the two types of turnover. Firms experiencing partial turnover have average fin-specific abnormal return of +12.9%, compared to -7.1% for the complete turnover fins. The t-statistic for the difference between the two is 2.66. Furthermore, the fin-specific abnormal return for fins where the Forbes-listed top executive does not change is only 2.6%. which is much lover than 12.9% (t-l.4l), the figure for partial turnover firms. This evidence indicates that firms experiencing partial turnover exhibit superior within-industry performance.
These results suggest that far from being a disciplining device, partial turnover is more of a reward to the current management team for especially good performance. This seems plausible: the board should be more inclined tc pick a successor from the incumbent management team when its operating strategy proves successful and hence worth continuing. Consistent with this interpretation, the primary source of superior performance is within industry, where partial turnover firms outperform both complete turnover and no turnover firms. This evidence supports our not treating partial turnover as a disciplinary control outcome.
Concluding Comments.
This paper has attempted to assess the effectiveness of the board of directors in disciplining top managers. We have found that the board is not completely unresponsive to poor performance. When a firm significantly underperforms its industry, the probability of complete turnover of the top management team rises. This result suggests that boards compare the performance of the firm with that of other firms in its industry, and sometimes remove top managers when they cannot keep up with the industry.
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But the 1980s have presented the board of directors with a harder problem. During this period, because of deregulation, commodity price shocks, and foreign competition, whole industries such as airlines, oil, and steel have suffered adverse shocks. As discussed by Jensen (1986) and Shleifer and Vishny (1989) , shareholder value could be raised in many of these industries through painful measures such as restructurings, selloff of assets, employee layoffs, and wage reductions. Despite wide disagreement about whether there are net social gains from such strategies, it is fair to say that shareholders typically benefit from them.
The evidence in this paper indicates that the board of directors has not been a major force in removing unresponsive managers in poorly performing industries. Instead, this function has been accomplished by hostile takeovers. Our evidence supports the view that takeover organizers have taken advantage of opportunities raised by the ineffectiveness of internal control devices such as the board of directors and incentive pay. To the extent that internal control devices are cheaper to operate and are more conducive to long-ten planning by incumbent management than are hostile takeovers, the replacement of the oversight function of the board by the external market for corporate control might be deemed a third-beet situation. Shleifer and Vishny (1988) have made some proposals aimed at making internal control devices more effective, and so rendering hostile takeovers less important for shareholders. aNumbers in parentheses are t-statistics for test of equality of means for partial turnover and respective control outcome.
bAll abnormal returns are estimated from a monthly CAPM equation for 1/78 through 12/80. These numbers are converted to total abnormal returns over the period 1/78 -12/80 for ease of interpretation.
